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This  study examines the effect  of  underwriter reputation on the initial-day IPO returns in an emerging  
market. It uses both a traditional and an extended model given the characteristics of the IPO market under  
analysis. The results from the traditional model indicate that underwriter reputation does not affect  the  
initial day IPO returns. However, after controlling for factors that are important in determining the price of  
an IPO in an emerging market, a complex relationship between underwriter reputation measures and IPO 
returns is documented. Results in this paper indicate that it is not appropriate to extend the findings in the 
US to other markets without taking into account the unique characteristics of these markets. 
 
The short- and long-run performances of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) have long been an issue of interest in 
the finance literature. Previous studies have shown that the IPOs of common stock yield positive short-run 
raw returns and negative long-run market-adjusted returns (Rock, 1986; Jog and Riding, 1987; Tinic, 1988, 
Finn and Higham, 1988; Ritter, 1991; Keasey and Short, 1992; Levis, 1993; Kunz and Aggarwal, 1994; Lee, 
Taylor and Walter, 1996a). The positive short-run returns documented in the literature are interpreted as an 
evidence of underpricing in the offer price. Carter and Manaster (1990) develop an equilibrium model that 
explains the relationship between this underpricing and the prestige of the underwriter who brings the issue 
to the market. According to their model, prestigious underwriters (those with high reputation) are associated 
with lower amounts of IPO underpricing. Since the early 1970s, several studies have tested this argument by 
using different measures of underwriter reputation (McDonald and Fisher, 1972; Block and Stanley, 1980; 
Neuberger and LaChapelle, 1983; Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Johnson and Miller, 1988; Carter and Manaster, 
1990;  Booth and Chua,  1996;  Nanda and Yun,  1997;  Carter,  Dark and Singh,  1998).  All  these  studies 
conclude that, on average, short-run returns are less positive for those IPOs that are brought to the market by 
more prestigious underwriters. In this study, the objective is to examine the relationship between underwriter 
reputation and IPO performance in an emerging market. Similar to results from developed markets, several 
studies document positive abnormal initial day IPO returns in emerging markets (Dawson, 1987; Aggarwal, 
Leal and Hernandez, 1993; Lee, Taylor and Walter, 1996b). On the other hand, several characteristics of 
emerging markets might cause the relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO performance in these 
markets to be different than the relationship observed in developed markets (Harvey, 1995). It is usually 
argued that the information asymmetry is severe and the informational efficiency is low in emerging markets. 
As a result, it takes a long time for any information to be fully reflected in asset prices and it is more costly 
for investors to collect and process information in these markets. Hence, on one hand, underwriter reputation 
can be very helpful for investors in solving their asymmetric information problems in such a market. On the 
other hand, the information asymmetry might be so severe that, unlike the case in an informationally efficient 
market, the underwriter reputation may not be sufficient to reduce this asymmetry between the firm going 
public and investors in an inefficient market. Furthermore, it might be difficult for investors to assess the 
reputation of the underwriter itself as a result of the severe information asymmetries. Therefore, even though 
prior research documents the significant negative impact of underwriter reputation on IPO performance in the 
US market, it may not be plausible to expect such a relationship to exist for IPOs in an emerging market. As 
a result, it is difficult to determine a priori the impact of underwriter reputation on IPO performance in such a 
market. This is an issue that needs to be examined empirically. 
This paper analyzes the relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing in the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange (ISE). Domestic and foreign investors alike who are investing in emerging markets with 
characteristics similar  to the ISE can benefit  from the results  of this  paper.  The sample consists  of one 
hundred  and  eighteen  IPOs  that  took  place  during  a  period  from  January,  1993  to  June,  1999.  The 
underwriter reputation is proxied by four measures developed using the number and the dollar magnitude of 
size the offerings an underwriter conducts. . A traditional model (used in studies for the US) and its modified 
version for an emerging market are estimated to test the relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO 
underpricing. 
Given the available data on underwriters in Turkey, it  is  not possible  to estimate all  of  the underwriter 
reputation  measures  used  in  the  US.  Therefore,  modified  versions  of  the  Johnson  and  Miller  and  the 
Megginson and Weiss measures are calculated for the underwriters. Also, two new reputation measures are 
suggested  given the  characteristics  of  the IPO market  in  Turkey.  In  summary,  four  different  reputation 
measures are calculated for the underwriters. 
When the traditional model is estimated for the IPOs in Turkey (Table I), no relationship between initial day 
IPO returns and the underwriter reputation is documented regardless of which reputation measure is used. 
The only variable that explains the initial day IPO returns is the 15-day return on the market index before the 
first  day of trading (institutional lag variable).  The relationship between initial  day IPO returns and this 
institutional lag variable is positive. This result implies that if the market increases between the IPO date and 
the first day of trading, the initial day IPO returns will be positive as well. 
The traditional model is extended to account for the unique characteristics of the IPO market in Turkey 
(Table II). Two reputation measures that account for different aspects of underwriter reputation are included 
and four more control variables are added to the models. The first  reputation measure assumes that two 
underwriters  with the highest number of IPOs lead or co-lead are prestigious and the rest  are  not.  This 
variable measures the visibility of an underwriter in the IPO market. The second reputation variable in the 
regression is a proxy for the volume of IPO business (either in dollar amount or in number) lead or co-lead 
by an underwriter. In this extended model, a negative relationship between the initial day IPO returns and the 
visibility  measure  is  found.  This  finding  indicates  that  since  these  underwriters  are  well  known by the 
investors, they underprice to a lesser degree. On the other hand, the relationship between the volume of IPOs 
and the initial day IPO returns is positive. The more IPOs an underwriter handles, the harder it would be to 
sell the shares. Therefore, these underwriters have to underprice to a higher degree. These results suggest that 
in contrast to the evidence for the US IPOs, the relationship between initial day IPO returns and underwriter 
reputation is rather complex in the ISE. 
In addition to the institutional lag variable, two more control variables have a statistically significant impact 
on IPO underpricing. These variables are the age of the firm and a dummy variable for relatedness of the IPO 
firm and the underwriter. The age has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in these regressions 
indicating that older firms will be underpriced to a higher degree. This conflicting finding could be a result of 
the opaque ownership  structure  in  Turkey.  The  related variable  has  positive  and statistically  significant 
coefficient as well,  implying that those IPOs brought to the market by underwriters owned by the same 
parent company as the issuing firm will be underpriced to a higher degree. This finding indicates that the 
asymmetric information between investors and IPO firms is the main determinant of the level of underpricing 
in Turkey. When the underwriter is not related to the IPO firm, the investors have a greater confidence in the 
certification of the IPO price provided by the independent underwriter. As a result, underwriters that are not 
owned by the same parent company as the issuing firm do not have to underprice as much as the non-related 
underwriters. On the other hand, when the underwriter and the IPO firm are owned by the same parent 
company, the price certification provided by this underwriter does not have as much value as that provided 
by an independent underwriter for the investors. Therefore, in this case, investors require a higher discount to 
participate in these IPOs.
The findings  of  this  paper  indicate  that  evidence  on  underwriter  reputation  and initial  day  IPO returns 
documented in the US cannot be extended to emerging markets without any modification. The results here 
can be extended to other emerging markets with similar characteristics as the ISE. Since the participation of 
international investors in the IPOs of emerging markets is quite common, the findings of this paper have 
some investment implications for international investors. 
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 Table I
Regression - Traditional Model
This table reports the regression estimates of initial IPO returns on four different reputation measures and 
five control variables. The regression model is a linear specification of the following equation:
IPO return = f (Reputation, Age of Issuing firm, Insider shares, Offer size, Risk, Market 
Performance) 
IPO return is the simple one-day return calculated from the offer price and the closing price on the first 
trading day of the IPO shares Reputation is one of the four reputation measures used in the study. REP1 is the 
Megginson and Weiss (MW) measure where reputation is measured as the ratio of the total dollar amount of 
IPOs brought to the market by the lead underwriter of a given IPO to the total dollar amount of all IPOs in 
the sample. REP2 is calculated by taking the ratio of the number of IPOs underwritten by an underwriter to 
the total number of IPOs during the sample period. REP3 is a 4-scale measure and it classifies underwriters 
into four groups based on their REP1 measure. REP4 is a 2-level scale measure. It takes a value of 1 if the 
underwriter is one of the first two underwriters with the highest REP2 score in the sample and a value of 0 
for the rest. Age of the issuing firm is the number of years the issuing firm has been in operation between its 
inception and June 30,  1999. Insider shares  is  the percentage of  the IPO issue that  is  offered from the 
holdings of the shareholders. Risk is the standard deviation of IPO returns over a 20-day period starting from 
the second day of trading. Offer size is the size of the IPO issue in millions of dollars. Market performance is 
the 15-day return on the market index prior to the first trading day of the IPO shares.
 Table II
Regression - Extended Model
This table reports the regression estimates of initial IPO returns on four different reputation measures and 
five control variables. The regression model is a linear specification of the following equation:
IPO return = f (Reputation, Age of Issuing firm, Insider shares, Offer size, Risk, Market 
Performance, Bank, Related, Sales method, Requirement) 
IPO return is the simple one-day return calculated from the offer price and the closing price on the first 
trading day of the IPO shares Reputation is one of the four reputation measures used in the study. REP1 is the 
Megginson and Weiss (MW) measure where reputation is measured as the ratio of the total dollar amount of 
IPOs brought to the market by the lead underwriter of a given IPO to the total dollar amount of all IPOs in 
the sample. REP2 is calculated by taking the ratio of the number of IPOs underwritten by an underwriter to 
the total number of IPOs during the sample period. REP3 is a 4-scale measure and it classifies underwriters 
into four groups based on their REP1 measure. REP4 is a 2-level scale measure. It takes a value of 1 if the 
underwriter is one of the first two underwriters with the highest REP2 score in the sample and a value of 0 
for the rest. Age of the issuing firm is the number of years the issuing firm has been in operation between its 
inception and June 30,  1999. Insider shares  is  the percentage of  the IPO issue that  is  offered from the 
holdings of the shareholders. Risk is the standard deviation of IPO returns over a 20-day period starting from 
the second day of trading. Offer size is the size of the IPO issue in millions of dollars. Market performance is 
the 15-day return on the market index prior to the first trading day of the IPO shares. Bank is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 for banks or bank-affiliated underwriters. Related is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the issuing firm and the underwriter are owned by the same individuals or by the same 
parent  company.  Sales  method,  is  a  dummy variable  that  takes  a  value  of  one  if  the  sales  method  in 
underwriting is  a  fixed price offer  and zero if  the shares  are  either  sold directly  on the Istanbul  Stock 
Exchange or the book-building method is used. Requirement is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
the issuing firm and the underwriter are owned by the same individuals or by the same parent company.
  
